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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg 
he XXIXth meeting of the European Security Forum was also the opportunity to launch the 
book “Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor ? The European Union and its global partners” 
edited by one of our speakers, Nathalie Tocci. We were therefore fortunate to be able to draw 
both from the presentations given at our 26 May meeting and from the work done by the contributors 
to this timely book. 
Lanxin Xiang, Professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva (IHED) presented his paper under the title 
“There is no such thing as a normative Chinese model”, underscoring that the Chinese view is ethical 
and temporal rather than ‘spatial’ (i.e. in which politics are polarised along left/right lines). Thus 
China likes Europe’s social (i.e. ethical) democracy, but not democracy as egalitarianism. China, we 
were reminded, takes the long view. To the chairman’s doubts about Chinese views on the non-use of 
force being close to those of the EU – after all, hadn’t China resorted to force to ‘teach a lesson’ to 
Vietnam in 1979; and didn’t China publicly state the possibility of using force to recover Taiwan? – 
the speaker indicated that China tended to use force defensively (as in Korea in 1950 or against India 
in 1962). Mention of Admiral Zheng He’s navy in the XVth century was made. Lanxin Xiang 
reaffirmed the view made in his paper that the post-modern EU and traditional Chinese mentality bear 
strong resemblances, and that EU and Chinese foreign policies could converge, notwithstanding 
different approaches to the central place of democratisation in EU norms. 
In her oral presentation Radha Kumar of the Delhi Policy Group also drew on the long historical view, 
emphasising the role of Kautilya (3
rd century BC) as a source of Indian foreign policy inspiration 
notably in defining the three pillars of state behaviour (engagement; adherence to rule-based norms 
supervised by judges; transparency). She noted that these were at some variance with enlightenment 
values as retailed through British colonial rule; they are closer to US approaches. She reminded us that 
foreign policy in Indian history had been the product of Empire (Maurya, Moghol…). In domestic 
terms, the constitutional emphasis is on collective rather than on individual rights; pluralism in a union 
composed of language-based states goes further than in the US or European constitutions. Certain 
rights (e.g. family law) are administered by the corresponding religion. 
She noted that during the Cold War, India’s policy of non-engagement was at variance with the 
historical record. To a question from the chair noting the disconnect between India’s democratic 
nature and Kautilyan legacy on the one hand, and a Realpolitik approach in Sudan and Myanmar 
similar to that of China, she noted that: 
-  In Sudan, India is a profit-sharing partner in the greater Nile oil consortium, but is not physically 
present as an actor on the ground; 
-  In Myanmar, India is courting the Junta as a response to Chinese influence. 
In conclusion, she remarked that the Achilles heel of Indian foreign policy was its sometimes 
unrealistic strand, as in the opposition of part of the body-politic (e.g. the CP-ML) against the nuclear 
deal with the US. 
Andrey Makaryachev, Professor at the University of Nizhny-Novgorod, spoke to his paper entitled “In 
quest of subjectivity: Russia’s normative offensive and the triple politicisation of norms”, noting that 
Russia’s foreign policy had become increasingly norm-based in terms of the arguments used, as is 
witnessed by the handling of the Kosovo issue. The disagreements are less on the general nature of 
norms (peace, security, democracy, liberty, human rights, etc.) than on their content; and there 
continues to be a refusal of any kind of judgement on Russia’s domestic standards. 
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Walter Slocombe, former US Undersecretary of Defense presented the paper prepared by Daniel 
Hamilton on “The United States: A normative power?” (a contributor to the book edited by Nathalie 
Tocci). He stressed that a normative policy implies standards that are consistent, explicit and 
universal, noting the importance of the Enlightenment legacy. Since Kosovo had been mentioned, he 
underlined the tension between normative ends and normative means; the Kosovo campaign had been 
the opposite of an interest-driven war. 
Nathalie Tocci, presenting her paper “When and Why Does the EU Act as a Normative Power in its 
Neighbourhood?”, focused on the question of ends and means applied to the case of the EU. She noted 
that it was easier to agree on norms than to act on them; that it’s easier to be normative when interests 
are not involved; that there is a need for mechanisms to define the collective EU interest; and that 
normativity tends to apply in contractual, civilian relations, whereas its ceases to be at a premium 
when we face coercive influences. 
Given the wealth of presentations, time for debate from the floor was limited. A German participant 
raised the issue of the stability of a multi (or non)-polar system, as well as that of the consequences of 
cultural relativism for war and peace: after all, there had been a lot of cultural relativism on show 
between the contrasting presentations. He also wanted to draw out the panellists on the ‘tying of 
hands’ in a normative foreign policy, an issue much dwelt upon in Ms. Tocci’s paper. A Dutch 
participant wondered whether there could be agreement on universal norms between some of the 
rather parochial great powers. A member of the Russian mission referred to his country’s desire for 
deep reform of the OSCE, in terms of ODHIR (Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) 
and the election observers. 
Lanxin Xiang, in response, noted that there is no universal Chinese set of norms, that China is agnostic 
in this regard. He considered that multi-polarity can be stable, with a form of “democratisation of 
international relations”. 
Radha Kumar held the view that there is a core base of principles on which there can be agreement. As 
for the tying of hands, she stated that the UN still remains the institution of choice, but that reform is 
required; unfortunately, the trend in this regard was towards fragmenting rather than universalising. 
China needed to become a major player in the Bretton Woods institutions as well as in the Asia 
context; but this would create complex reactions in the continent. Kosovo should be viewed as a 
specific European issue, not as a broader, global precedent, noting that Serbia in the erstwhile 
Yugoslav federal system had taken away Kosovo’s regional autonomy. 
Andrey Makarychev was sceptical about universal norms. He posed the question: “Who are the 
political actors of the international system?, since we now have alongside state actors, a number of 
collective actors (EU, NATO…), unrecognised states, NGO’s etc. What is the meaning of 
international society under these conditions, and how much multiplicity can we afford in the 
international society?” 
Walter Slocombe refused relativism when it comes to certain fundamental rights (such as the issue of 
abuse of detainees). Countries can live together with vastly different internal regimes. It may be true 
that everybody wraps their interests in norms and values: but the proposition can work the other way 
around (e.g. adopting democratic norms is usually good for interests such as business and peace). 
Nathalie Tocci reasserted the need for consistency. Kosovo may be small, but the way it is handled is 
important from the standpoint of actors of the global international system. Referring to the Chinese 
approaches, she also underscored the importance of the relational aspects of norms. 
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When and why does the EU act as a normative 
power in its neighbourhood?
1 
Nathalie Tocci
2 
Introduction 
Since its inception, the European Union was conceptualised as (and prided itself on being) a distinctly 
‘different’ type of international actor. Over the decades, it has been described as a ‘civilian’ (Dûchene, 
1973, p.19), a ‘soft’ (Hill, 1990) and most recently a ‘normative’ power in international relations 
(Manners, 2002, 2006). The EU’s official texts make similar claims about the Union’s role in world 
politics. Since the 1970s, in fact, norms and values began permeating European foreign policy 
documents and declarations (see Hill & Smith, 2000). At a two-day meeting of EU heads of state on 
14-15 December 1973, which resulted in a declaration on Europe's international identity, the delegates 
talked about building a ‘just basis’ for international relations. The 1986 Single European Act called 
upon the Community to “display the principles of democracy and compliance with the rule of law and 
with human rights” in its conduct of external relations. The 1988 Rhodes European Council called for 
an EU role in preserving international peace, promoting the solution to regional conflicts, 
demonstrating solidarity for democracy, supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations and improving social and economic conditions 
in less developed countries. The Maastricht Treaty went further, calling for the preservation of peace 
and security, the promotion of international cooperation, the fight against international crime, the 
development of democracy and the rule of law, the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the support for economic and social development (Article J.1). Most explicitly, the 
Lisbon Treaty states that in international affairs the EU would be guided by and would seek to 
promote the values on which the Union is founded, including democracy, human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law (Title V, Article 21; Title V, Article 2c).  
This paper attempts to go beyond these assertions. Rather than assuming that the EU is a normative 
international player simply by virtue of its declarations and its ‘different’ non-state nature, we take for 
granted that in different geographical regions and at different points in time, the Union’s foreign 
policies have taken on dramatically different forms. If by a normative foreign policy we mean 
pursuing normative foreign policy goals through normatively deployed means and having a discernible 
normative impact, then what emerges, perhaps inevitably, is that the EU is not always normative, as is 
the case with any other international actor. The fact that the EU is a sui generis actor as opposed to 
states such as the US, Russia, China or India, does not fundamentally alter the reality of its foreign 
policy practice. As we shall see below, at times EU foreign policy has been normative, while at other 
times it has been status quo oriented, at other times still it has been realist and even imperialistic. For 
the purpose of this paper, a realpolitik actor is one that pursues self-interest, in violation of laws and 
norms; an imperial actor is one that pursues normative goals but does so in violation of existing norms 
in the deployment of its foreign policy instruments; a status quo actor is one that pursues self-interest 
in compliance with existing norms and laws.  
In order to make sense of these different types of foreign policy approaches, this paper teases out the 
principal dynamics at work in determining why the EU acts the way it does in different cases, and 
draws some lessons about the nature of the EU’s role in the world. 
                                                      
1 This paper is largely drawn from N. Tocci et al. (2008), The EU as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor, CEPS 
Working Document No. 281, CEPS, Brussels.  
2 Nathalie Tocci is Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, and Research Fellow at CEPS.   4 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
The EU as a multifaceted foreign policy actor 
We can quite easily think of cases in which the EU has acted in a variety of different ways in world 
politics. Table 1 sets out cases in which the EU acted as a normative, realpolitik, imperial and status 
quo power, as well as cases in which the impact of EU foreign policies reflected (intended) or 
otherwise (unintended) the original foreign policy goals.   
Table 1. The EU’s role in the world: Selected sub-case studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperialistic Status  Quo   
Intended Unintended  Intended  Unintended Intended  Unintended Intended Unintended 
Goals 
 
 
 
             
Means 
 
              
Results 
 
               
Case 
Study 
Central & 
Eastern 
Europe 
 
Belarus 
 
Russia 
 
Syria  
 
Kosovo 
 
Israel- 
Palestine 
 
North 
Africa 
 
Ukraine 
 
Non-normative Normative 
In cases such as the eastern enlargement and policies towards neighbouring Belarus, the EU has 
pursued normative goals (political and economic reform) through policy instruments that were crafted 
and deployed within the confines of the law (the accession policy and targeted sanctions respectively). 
Yet while the EU succeeded in engendering democratisation and economic modernisation in Eastern 
Europe, its double-track strategy of sanctioning the Belarus regime while supporting civil society has, 
to date, failed to alter the nature and strength of the authoritarian regime in Minsk. The Belarus 
leadership has not reacted positively to EU sanctions, while EU actors recognise that they have been 
unable to convey effectively their message of support to the Belarusian population.  
By contrast, in the case of Russia and Syria, the EU has behaved in an overall realpolitik manner. Vis-
à-vis Russia, commercial and energy interests explain the sidetracking of EU political pressure on 
Moscow in the context of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Four Common Spaces; 
pressure has neither been exerted through dialogue nor conditionality. Likewise in Syria, realist 
concerns, such as preserving the regional balance of power between Israel and its neighbours, and 
following the line set by the US, have had a larger sway over EU policies than aims to see political 
transformation in Syria and a law-based agreement between Syria and Israel. In turn, the deployment 
of EU policy means has been rather inconsistent, ranging from un-kept promises of ratifying Syria’s 
Association Agreement, to sporadic pressure on the regime (i.e. regarding Lebanon) without constant 
attention to Syria’s deficient human rights record.  WHEN AND WHY DOES THE EU ACT AS A NORMATIVE POWER IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD? | 5 
In Kosovo and Israel-Palestine, the EU has behaved as an imperialistic actor, meaning an actor intent 
on creating new norms in the violation of existing international law. While intervening in the pursuit 
of normative goals (i.e. the prevention and rectification of injustice in Kosovo, and a two-state solution 
and respect for human rights in the Middle East;), the EU has often sidelined or violated international 
law. In the case of Kosovo this has taken place both in the context of war, unsanctioned by the UN, in 
which several member states took part. In the case of the Middle East, the EU, through its bilateral 
cooperation with Israel, has on several occasions (related to trade and research principally) extended 
benefits to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in violation of the Geneva conventions. Yet 
results have differed. While Kosovo’s independence has been recognised, possibly leading to a 
revisionist setting of ‘new norms’, in the Middle East, by contrast, a viable two-state solution appears 
to be an increasingly distant chimera (the Annapolis process notwithstanding), and violations of 
human rights and international law persist unabated.  
Finally, the EU has acted as a status quo player in North Africa and Ukraine. In both cases, the Union 
has primarily pursued non-normative goals. In North Africa, the EU prioritised its trade and 
increasingly its security interests over the promotion of political reform. Moreover, its trade policies, 
while beneficial to itself, have been detrimental to the growth and modernisation of the dependent 
North African economies, given its refusal to liberalise trade in agricultural products. In Ukraine on 
the other hand, while favouring Kiev’s European orientation and its reform process in principle, 
especially since the orange revolution, normative aims have been hollowed-out by the resistance of 
several member states to grant Ukraine a European perspective, not least out of fear of an eventual 
dilution of their power internally within the EU. In both cases, however, the means pursued by the EU 
were normative. Relations have been conducted through EU contractual relations, including the 
Association Agreements, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and, more recently, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Given that the EU has been on the stronger side of these contractual 
ties, Brussels has ensured that the pursuit of its self-interest has been channelled through clear and 
transparent legal rules. The results have differed however. In North Africa, EU involvement has not 
opened the way for a deep process of political and economic transformation, while in Ukraine, despite 
widespread feelings of deception on the part of the EU and ongoing political instability and corruption, 
the post-revolution period has seen the consolidation of democracy.  
The dynamics at work in EU foreign policy 
But what do these cases tell us about the EU as a (normative) foreign policy actor? And more precisely 
what are the factors determining how and why the EU acts in specific ways in different foreign policy 
instances? Several broad lessons can be brought to the fore.  
Beginning with the goals pursued, we can contrast the normative and imperialistic cases in which the 
EU opts for normative goals, with the realpolitik and the status quo cases, in which self-interest 
prevails. Why did the EU prioritise normative goals in cases such as Eastern Europe, Belarus, Kosovo 
and Palestine; but not in Syria, Russia, North Africa and Ukraine? 
Analysing these cases, it emerges that when the EU has acted as a normative or imperialistic power, 
pursuing normative goals, normative and self-interest objectives have either overlapped or have not 
contradicted each other. In the case of Belarus, the EU has been able to pursue its (limited) trade 
interests alongside its democracy-driven sanctions. In the case of Eastern Europe instead, in view of 
the paramount strategic objective of ‘reuniting Europe’, the EU could not tolerate the candidate 
countries’ blatant violations of norms, in so far as these could ultimately threaten the EU from within. 
In this respect, enlargement policy can be seen as a special case precisely because it is not, strictu 
senso, foreign policy. Likewise in the two imperialistic cases, after decades (in Israel-Palestine) or 
years (in Kosovo) of standstill, the member states converged at the level of rhetoric, to pursue 
normative objectives consisting in a rights-based, two-state solution in both Israel-Palestine and 
Serbia-Kosovo. In both cases, discursively agreeing on normative goals has been the least 6 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
controversial option for the EU, despite the fact that, particularly in the case of Kosovo, important 
differences between member states remain.  
In the realpolitik and status quo cases, instead, the configuration of self interests and intra-EU 
divisions has been far more pronounced, leading to a prioritisation of self-interest. On the one hand, 
strong and competing self-interests such as energy security (Russia), transatlantic cooperation in the 
Middle East (Syria), commercial interests and the management of migration flows (North Africa), and 
member state preservation of their internal power (Ukraine) have trumped competing normative 
objectives. On the other hand, the primary concern of several member states to pursue their disjointed 
self-interests at the expense of EU-wide objectives, and member state ability in EU foreign policy to 
veto collective action explains the prioritisation of self-interest in these cases.  
Turning to the foreign policy means used, here normative behaviour can be found in the normative and 
the status quo case studies, in contrast to the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, in which the EU has 
acted in contravention of or sidelined international law and multilateral institutions. The primary, 
albeit not only, explanation of why this has been the case seems to lie in the EU’s internal capability, 
although in a manner that partly contradicts the intuitive consensus about EU foreign policy. The 
problem in fact does not seem to lie in the fact that the EU has insufficient capabilities (e.g., in the 
military domain). Normative means tend to be deployed when the EU chooses to act within the 
confines of its international agreements with third states and has limited or no coercive instruments at 
its disposal. Indeed, normative means have been deployed in cases where the primary vehicles of EU 
policy have been contractual relations, whether the accession process (Eastern Europe), the association 
process (North Africa), the Partnership and Cooperation process (Belarus) or the ENP (Ukraine).  
By contrast, whereas the EU has disposed of contractual options in the realpolitik and imperialistic 
cases, it has either chosen not to make use of these instruments (Syria) or it has pursued its objectives 
beyond the blueprint and stated aims of these contracts (Russia, Kosovo and Israel-Palestine). Of 
course, in some cases, the EU has been strongly pressed by external actors and factors to sideline rules 
and law. In the Middle East, the US has induced the Union to either avoid concluding a contractual 
agreement (Syria), or to set aside or violate the norms, rules and laws embedded in these agreements 
(Israel-Palestine). In the other cases, Russia’s new assertiveness has either obstructed international 
legal channels (Kosovo) or cornered the Union into sidelining the human rights and democracy 
standards spelt out in its bilateral agreements with Moscow.   
Yet while important in defining or constraining foreign policy means, the external environment is 
critical above all in influencing the EU’s foreign policy impact. Naturally, what the EU does is the 
primary determinant of its impact. Hence, it is far more likely that the Union will have a normative 
impact when it pursues normative goals and means (Eastern Europe) than when it acts in an 
imperialistic, realpolitik or status quo way. But on the one hand, the Belarus case exemplifies that this 
is not always the case and that the Union can fail to engender a normative result despite its pursuit of 
normative goals through normative means. On the other hand, the cases of Syria, Ukraine and Kosovo 
suggest that the EU can have a normative impact even when either its goals or policy means are not 
normative.  
Especially in these non-intuitive cases, the role of the external environment is of the essence. A 
conducive external context is of primary importance for an effective normative impact. In Syria, 
Damascus’ isolation by the West and its many internal weaknesses explain in part why, to some 
extent, the Ba’ath regime has abided by international norms, especially in terms of retreating from 
Lebanon and accepting an international presence there. Furthermore, the EU is Syria’s first trading 
partner and is viewed as a less aggressive actor than the US. Hence, against all odds, Damascus strives 
to keep a door open to Brussels. In Kosovo, despite Russian resistance, the West has the power to 
assert the end-game and recognise secession, even if in contravention of international law. In Ukraine, 
paradoxically it is the nearby pressurising influence of Moscow that has induced pro-reform actors in 
Kiev to latch on to the EU irrespective of what the Union says and does and in spite of the EU’s 
lukewarm reception of Ukraine’s membership ambitions. In the case of Eastern Europe however, the WHEN AND WHY DOES THE EU ACT AS A NORMATIVE POWER IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD? | 7 
complementary support of the US and the international financial institutions, as well as the warm 
reception of EU involvement by the Eastern European countries has served to bolster the effectiveness 
of normative EU goals and means. 
By contrast, an unfavourable external environment, coupled with EU weakness vis-à-vis third states or 
the wider milieu, reduces the likelihood of a normative impact. In Belarus, in the absence of free 
media, the Belarus leadership has divulgated its own vision of reality, hardened its stance and 
instumentalised Western pressure to induce a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Belarus’ relatively stable 
economic situation and its geopolitical anchorage to Russia have also made the country less dependent 
upon Europe. In Russia, the discovery of energy leverage and an accompanying political 
(re)assertiveness on the international scene have contributed to undermining the effectiveness of the 
EU’s normative message, and allowed Moscow to play member state interests against each other. In 
the Middle East, the EU’s acceptance of playing second fiddle to the US, its preoccupation with 
maintaining close ties with Israel and the hold that Israel itself has on the EU have all induced the 
Union to strive for a modicum of stability in the region and respect rights. Finally in North Africa, 
whereas the EU has sufficiently strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the Maghreb countries, the 
resilience of these regimes has reduced the prospect that the EU’s (secondary) normative goals will 
have a discernible impact on the ground.  
Transforming the EU into a normative power in the world 
The discussion on means and impact points to a conundrum. On the one hand, the EU is more likely to 
pursue normative means when power relations between the EU and a third state are relatively balanced 
and relations develop within the confines of mutually negotiated agreements. On the other hand, 
power and particularly relational power seems to be of critical importance to engendering a normative 
impact, given that even the best of intentions may be an insufficient condition of success (Belarus). 
How can the EU escape this conundrum and maximise its chances of acting as a ‘normative power’ 
(Manners, 2002), as it repeatedly proclaims its role in the world?  
In so far as the EU and its member states do not live, at least not always, on Kagan’s Venus (Kagan, 
2003), but rather are also driven by self-interest just like any other international actor, there is little 
point in naively asserting that the EU should sideline its interests and goals in the name of its 
proclaimed norms. Desirable as it may be, simply calling for this to happen will not change the 
dynamics at work. Neither can the EU single-handedly affect the external environment in which its 
foreign policies unfold. While it can certainly influence the external context, particularly in its 
neighbourhood where it has real foreign policy presence, it is also bound to rely on fortuitous external 
circumstances to effectively assert its normative power. 
One suggestion is to improve the EU’s internal capabilities. This would not necessarily mean 
strengthening capabilities in the classic sense of the term such as for example organising greater 
economic leverage or building military capacity. Strengthening capabilities in these terms could, by 
contrast, damage the EU’s normative role by generating internal EU incentives to bend the law in 
order to pursue foreign policy goals in the interests of the EU or its member states. Instead, the Union 
could strengthen its web of contractual relations with third states in a manner that would ‘tie its own 
hands’, thus reducing its ability to act non-normatively. This would entail developing further the set of 
rules and laws that bind EU external behaviour in relation to third states, and link these rules and 
norms explicitly to the obligations set under international law. It would also entail establishing or 
strengthening the EU’s internal institutional watchdog mechanisms, ensuring that when one EU actor 
(such as the Council or Commission) behaves or is tempted to behave in contravention of set rules, 
others (such as the Parliament) are ready and able to prevent this from happening. Understanding the 
importance of working in this direction is predicated upon an appreciation that the EU is not 
necessarily normative and that its internal actors are often driven by the very same set of interests and 
priorities that motivate other international actors. A shift in this direction would also substantiate 8 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
claims that the EU’s sui generis nature reflects a truly novel identity as a normative actor in world 
politics. 
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The United States: A normative power? 
Daniel Hamilton
1 
The shifting centres of gravity in US foreign policy 
This paper on US foreign policy summarises the conclusions of a larger study, which in turn is a 
contribution to a multi-country project (concerning also the EU, China, India and Russia), published 
by CEPS and edited by Tocci et al. This project has used a common analytical framework, consisting 
of several stylised foreign policy paradigms: normative, realpolitik, imperial, and status quo. Tocci 
acknowledges that the same international actor can display all these types of foreign policy in different 
regions and in different policy areas at different points in time. The US case study indicated that the 
US, at least can – and does in fact – engage in each of these ways simultaneously.  
But what do these typologies really tell us? Do they help us answer the question of whether the US is a 
normative power? While the US may at times indulge in all of types of foreign policy, this however 
begs the deeper question: overall, which most closely reflects the core of US foreign policy? Which 
examples are representative of deeper currents in American society, and which are not? Which are 
exemplars and which are exceptions?  
Our first finding is to refute the rather superficial claim that the US used to be a normative power but 
isn’t today. While most ‘normative power EU’ theorists acknowledge, in the words of Diez and 
Manners (2007, pp. 170, 174, 186), that the US “has exemplified the concept of a normative power 
during parts of its history”, particularly “in the inter-war and immediate post-war periods”, they deny 
that this has been true more recently. As this study has shown, however, the US advanced normative 
and non-normative goals, and deployed normative and non-normative means, before and after World 
War II, just as it does today. The reality is that the relative value or cost of these options has presented 
itself to every US Administration and Congress; the US has not swung from purely normative phases 
to non-normative ones.  
This underscores my point that the more appropriate question is not whether the US is a normative 
actor but the degree to which it is one. I submit that this is also the more appropriate question when it 
comes to analysing other countries as well. To answer this question it is necessary to determine where 
the real centre of gravity lies when it comes to characterising the US role in the world. This requires us 
in turn to assign some kind of weighting to the different paradigms. 
Overall, my review of US foreign policy indicates that the United States has been and continues to be 
simultaneously a guardian of norms established by the international community; a norm entrepreneur 
challenging those norms and on balance pushing the international community toward stronger norms 
enshrining human rights and the rule of law and democratic societies; a norm externaliser when it tries 
to advance norms for others that it is reluctant to apply to itself; and a norm blocker when it comes to 
issues that may threaten its position, or that exacerbate domestic divisions among the co-equal 
branches of US government or among the fluid yet often conflicting currents of American domestic 
thought regarding America’s role in the world.  
In addition, due to shifting political constellations and the separation of powers inherent in the US 
constitutional system, it is not easy to predict where the US may come out on any particular normative 
issue. The open and rather fluid nature of the US system indicates that coalitions transcending nominal 
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party allegiances need to be built on most issues, and the strength and durability of such coalitions 
depend not only on the issue at hand, but on its relationship to many other issues.
2  
Moreover, the particular weight of any one of these typologies varies over time. In general it may be 
said that the ‘normative intended’ dimension carries considerable weight and is a legitimate source of 
pride within the US foreign policy tradition. There are of course cases in which the US seeks to 
advance normative goals through normative means, but with major unintended consequences, but on 
the whole these appear to be less weighty. Over the course of the past 90 years the US has also 
exhibited a strong tradition of hegemonic (as opposed to imperial) behaviour. There have been flashes 
of imperialism, but overall they have been subsumed within a broader pattern of hegemony. While one 
can certainly identify cases of US realpolitik, intended or unintended, overall they appear to arise on a 
more case-by-case, ad hoc basis and thus seem less representative than the other two categories. There 
are fewer identifiable cases of US status quo orientation, but here again the case study approach limits 
the analysis, since the US is considered widely to be a major, if not the main, custodian and steward of 
the current international system.  
In sum, the mainstream of US foreign policy tends more often than not to reflect a varying blend of 
normative and hegemonic approaches. This mainstream tradition, however, has been challenged by the 
historically unusual Wilsonian-Jacksonian coalition that over the past six years has dominated the US 
executive branch, with only some countervailing influence by the legislative and judicial branches. 
Challenges to the mainstream in the 1990s instead came more often than not from influential 
Jacksonian and Jeffersonian elements in the Congress. These shifting coalitions indicate that it is 
premature to conclude that the US has turned from the fundamental instincts that have guided it for the 
past sixty years. The rhetoric of the major contenders for the presidency in 2008, in fact, seems truer to 
mainstream tradition than to US activities of the recent past. Clinton, McCain and Obama each 
essentially claim to be the person best able to pass what Henry Kissinger has called the historical test 
for this generation of American leaders: how to use preponderant US power to achieve an international 
consensus behind widely accepted norms that will protect American values in a more uncertain future. 
As we have seen, there is a particularly acute tension within the normative-hegemonic approach, and 
that is the extent to which the US is willing or able to bind itself to the norms it advances for others. 
This tension has characterised US foreign policy for many decades. For instance, no country was more 
responsible than the United States for the creation of the United Nations, and President Harry Truman 
was clear from the outset what this would mean. On June 25, 1945, in his closing address to the San 
Francisco conference that drafted the UN Charter, he stated, ‘[W]e all have to recognize, no matter 
how great our strength, that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please”. This 
statement has not always sat comfortably with Truman’s successors. As Stephen Schlesinger (2006) 
notes, “Washington discovered soon after the UN’s birth that despite its veto power in the Security 
Council, it could not always control its wayward child. As a result, ever since 1945, US leaders have 
approached the UN with ambivalence: hoping, on the one hand, to use it to further US national 
security interests, while, on the other hand, worrying that too much involvement might constrain the 
United States' ability to act”.
3 This tension has characterised America’s approach to most international 
institutions and norms, even though public opinion polls consistently record strong public support for 
multilateral approaches to international challenges.  
The US has not always mastered this tension well. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes, “in non-
American eyes, there is a world of differences between the ‘righteous might’ of Roosevelt’s era and 
the self-righteous might of George W. Bush”.  
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On balance, however, and despite exceptions, over the past sixty years the US has sought to manage 
its normative-hegemonic interplay by accepting some limits on its power and being bound by broader 
international norms and commitments, in exchange for greater legitimacy and acceptance of its 
leadership by others. The unresolved question in the post-Cold War, post-September 11 world is 
whether the US and other key players are prepared to stick with this bargain, or whether the US will 
increasingly act as a ‘norm externaliser’, i.e. using its power to advance broad norms for others but 
refusing to apply such norms to itself, and whether other nations will refuse the ‘followership’ that 
leadership requires. “Nothing undermines US authority more than the perception that the United States 
considers itself too powerful to be bound by the norms we preach to others” notes former US National 
Security Advisor Sandy Berger (2004).  
Comparing the US and the EU 
Since this project was prompted by consideration of the EU as a normative power, and since much of 
the literature in this regard contains explicit or implicit references to the United States, a few points 
warrant consideration.  
First, much of the literature on the EU’s alleged ‘normative power’ ignores some fundamental 
underpinnings of European order that have enabled conceptions of normative power to develop and be 
exercised at all. During the first half of the 20
th century most Europeans squandered any pretension 
they might have had to normative leadership through two World Wars and continued colonial rule. 
Following World War II, the US security guarantee removed – at least for half a continent – a key 
source of European conflict: the perceived need by mistrustful European states to build arms and 
alliances against their own neighbours. The American security commitment offered west Europeans an 
umbrella under which they could reconcile and agree on new norms that could offer a common 
foundation upon which they could work together and with others. Over time, the reassurances offered 
by a supportive – yet comfortably distant – hegemon enabled Europeans to create a community within 
which they could derive their security from each other rather than against each other. The very 
creation of the EU and the ability of its members to domesticate their foreign policies and render them 
normative rested on security guarantees provided by the United States.  
It is perhaps easy today to forget that NATO was the umbrella under which the European integration 
project could proceed, or that postwar institutions were created as much to prevent west Europeans 
from again dragging the world into conflict and depression as to prevent Soviet dominance or 
communist infiltration. Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes that “[T]he creation of a quasifederation 
without collective security as a driving force was an aberration of history made possible to a great 
extent by the US”.
4 
Moreover, this security logic continues even today – despite the end of the Cold War, despite 
September 11, and despite transatlantic and inner-EU squabbles over Iraq and other issues. The US 
continues to provide the ultimate reassurance enabling Europeans to reconcile, build and extend their 
Union. This is as evident in Kosovo today as it has been throughout the Balkans for the past decade 
and more.
5 This logic has been particularly evident in the determination of Central and Eastern 
European states to join NATO as well as the EU. New member states have been very clear about this 
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relationship: while they have been keen to integrate with European societies within the EU, they are 
ultimately reassured in doing so through their membership in NATO.  
The ‘normative power’ Europe discourse is strangely silent on this point. I was struck that the case 
study of EU enlargement in the EU working paper failed to even mention the parallel process of 
NATO enlargement and the obvious relationship between the two. While each operates according to 
its own particular logic, most EU countries are NATO countries, and the same officials and 
populations have been addressing the same historic opportunity: to extend to as much of the European 
continent as possible the democratic, free-market space where war simply does not happen.  
This relates to a point Diez and Manners (2007, pp. 176, 180) have made about the relationship 
between normative and military power. “In contrast to civilian power”, they note, “normative power is 
not the opposite of military power. It is entirely conceivable that military force is used to back up the 
spread of normative values” and that “military capabilities may underpin normative power”. I couldn’t 
agree more. What is important to add, however, is that in some instances the military capabilities – and 
political commitment – that underpin the EU’s ability to project normative power are provided not by 
the EU but by the United States. 
Second, much of the literature describing “normative power EU” is highly selective, including policies 
of EU member states when it is convenient and excluding them when it is not. There are two 
dimensions to this. The first has to do with foreign policy, where authority and competence still reside 
largely with member states. The EU, qua EU, in fact, has little real purview over the vast range of 
foreign policy decisions confronting any particular EU nation. Any consideration of the EU as a 
normative foreign policy actor, therefore, needs to consider the actions of individual EU member 
states, not just examples of common EU action. This is important for our purposes because the 
tendency is to compare the EU with the United States. In one such comparison, for instance, Diez and 
Manners (2007, p. 182) argue that the US readily resorts to force, whereas “the fact” is that “the EU 
or, rather, EU member states consider the use of force a last resort”. Really? What about the British 
and Polish invasion of Iraq and Spanish support for it? What about German, British, French, Dutch 
etc. intervention in the Balkans without a UN mandate? What about French or British interventions in 
Africa or the British intervention in the Falklands? My point is not to criticise such decisions, it is to 
ask for greater analytical rigour – for this, too, is the EU. 
The other dimension has to do with domestic policies, or the extent to which EU member states have 
coordinated and ‘domesticated’ aspects of their interactions with one another. There is no doubt that in 
many areas there have been historic successes, even as progress is halting in other areas. The issue is 
whether the EU’s ‘normative power’ is enhanced by projecting such ‘domesticated’ policies abroad or 
by advancing them at home. This debate, new to the EU, echoes the long-standing American debate 
between Jeffersonians and Wilsonians. The EU’s normative power in this regard seems to be more 
influential simply through its example at home – the fact that nations that regularly used violence 
against each other now join together in common cause in a variety of traditionally domestic policy 
areas. There seem to be relatively few examples where the EU has projected its ‘domesticated’ 
policies abroad. The death penalty seems to be a prominent one, but even here success seems limited 
largely to Europe and Latin America, and problems of ratification and implementation in vast parts of 
the world remain (Katzenstein, 2006). Nonetheless, the possibilities are intriguing. 
If one looks for examples beyond treaties and international law, however, one uncovers some 
promising experiments in the international extension of domesticated EU policies – particularly with 
the US. The recently created Transatlantic Economic Council, for instance, is in essence an effort to 
tie the US and the EU into a consultative process that identifies and then seeks to resolve domestic 
regulatory or policy barriers to the deeper integration of their economies, and to consider whether 
common standards developed through this process could form the basis for broader international 
norms. Yet it is striking that most of the literature either ignores the US dimension or goes to great 
pains to define “normative power EU” against the US example. THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER? | 13 
These considerations lead to a third point – the role of the United States, or perhaps more accurately, 
stereotypes of the United States, in European debates about ‘identity politics’. Proponents of 
“normative power EU” refreshingly acknowledge that the notion of ‘normative power’ is part of the 
broader debate about identity politics in Europe, and as such requires an ‘other’ against which such 
identities are constructed. “Not only is the success of this representation” of normative power EU “a 
precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU”, state Diez and Manners (2007, 
pp. 173-188), “it also constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside 
world’”. After reviewing the literature, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the ‘other’, 
whom, the adherents of “normative power EU” are constructing their arguments ‘against’ is in fact the 
EU’s closest partner, the United States. 
Diez and Manners explicitly seek to draw such distinctions. They argue that the American tradition of 
‘exceptionalism’ essentially disqualifies the US from being considered a normative power, whereas it 
is precisely what they believe to be Europe’s ‘ordinariness’ that provides “normative power EU” with 
such strength and attraction. This represents almost wilful ignorance of the strong exceptionalist 
rhetoric that is part and parcel of daily European political debates. In fact, the very premise of 
normative power is that Europe is uniquely positioned to guide humanity to a better future.  
The more compelling distinction, it seems to me, is rooted in each partner’s sense of its own 
exceptionalism. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes, historians trace difficulties between France and 
the US to their similar sense of mission, of being the upholders of political and philosophical models 
for the world through the avowedly universal reach of their respective 18
th century revolutions. I 
would add that German critiques of the US are also rooted in part in a German sense of 
exceptionalism: since Germany had been exceptionally evil, many Germans today believe their 
country must be exceptionally good. Since the US helped inculcate such beliefs in German society 
over two generations, it is particularly grating for Germans when US achievements fail to meet US 
aspirations, or when US demands of solidarity force Germans to abandon black and white in favour of 
grey. The moralistic undertone to much German critique is inescapable, even when it is not explicit. 
These dilemmas arise in part because both the US and the EU think of themselves as normative 
powers projecting their internal norms of democracy and human rights abroad. Nevertheless these two 
competing exceptionalisms are of a different kind. As Nicolaidis (2004) notes:  
Their respective founding myths, the escape from despotism and the escape from nationalism, 
tyranny from above and tyranny from below, led both entities to elevate commitment to the 
rule of law as their core. But this was domestic law in the US, supra-national law in the EU; 
this meant checks and balance between branches of government on one side, between states 
on the other. While the US progressively became a federal state, the EU, admittedly still in its 
infancy, is braced to remain a federal union of nation-states. In the last two decades, while 
both the US and the EU have been fertile grounds for exploring “subsidiarity”, and multilevel 
governance, the EU alone has explored ways of doing this without coordination by a 
centralized state, through methods that might one day be relevant to global governance. US 
exceptionalism is a national project; European a postnational one.
6 
Within this distinction lies an opportunity: to reconcile these different ‘normative’ traditions rather 
than to deny the legitimacy of one or the other or to ignore the common foundations upon which they 
are based – all in all, an attractive agenda for US-EU relations. 
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In Quest of Political Subjectivity: Russia’s 
‘Normative Offensive’ and the Triple 
Politicisation of Norms 
 
Andrey S.Makarychev
1 
 
ussia is usually portrayed as either a fundamentally pragmatic or a Realpolitik type of 
international actor. Yet the end of Putin’s presidency was marked by what might be 
figuratively called Russia’s ‘normative offensive’: surprisingly enough, Russian foreign policy 
discourse became – at least rhetorically - increasingly normative. In fact Moscow seems not only to 
accept the normative challenges thrown down by parts of Europe but even to politically counter-attack 
in the normative battlefield. According to a renowned Russian journalist, “pragmatism is death for 
Russia. Without a value-oriented positioning Russia would simply turn into a resource-rich object of 
alien subjects’ policies”.
2  
Starting from the outbreak of the ‘colour revolutions’ in countries of its ‘near abroad’ Russia, indeed, 
has invested heavily in the infrastructure of a soft power.
3 This type of reaction could be discerned, for 
example, in the State Duma statement of October 2nd, 2007 accusing the Saakashvili regime of 
violating the principles of democracy and abusing human rights, including tightening control over 
opposition, the media and dissidents. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s key normative argument refers 
to the security decisions taken without due account of public opinion as “non-democratic” (of course, 
the point here is the Ukrainian NATO application). In 2008 Russia proudly announced the 
establishment of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) with two key headquarters – in 
Paris and New York. This move, quite new in the tradition of Russian foreign policy, can be 
interpreted as a direct response to the activities of European and American foundations and think tanks 
in Russia and, simultaneously, as an alternative to the Western interpretations of normativity in world 
politics. 
In theory, there are two important facets to normative behaviour. Firstly, a normative power has to be 
grounded in a certain set of ideas, as opposed to the pursuance of purely material advantages. 
Secondly, a normative power has to be based upon multilateral institutions, as opposed to unilateral 
actions. Only a combination of these two aspects gives a proper model of normativity in international 
relations. Seen from this perspective, the emergent normative framework of Russian foreign policy so 
far seems to be deficient. Even the cooperation within the Northern Dimension initiative, in spite of its 
undeniable normative background in terms of establishing multilateral trans-border mechanisms, was 
largely perceived by sub-national elites in Russian regions as a source of economic and financial 
gains. By the same token, Russia’s commitments to international legal norms in the Kosovo issue were 
contaminated by the unveiled pursuance of economic goals as well. Russia’s harsh criticism of 
Estonia’s decision to remove the Second World War monument in 2007 did not reveal a 
comprehensive normative policy conduct either: it was based upon a strong ideational background but 
lacked both a clear institutional dimension and mechanisms of coordination with other (at least post-
Soviet) countries.  
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Against this background one may presume that the normative turn in Kremlin foreign policy can be 
discussed as one of its political instruments aimed at reinstalling Russia as one of key international 
subjects and an organic part of the ‘international society’– a status which, Moscow feels, is either 
disputed or directly challenged by many in the West. As the IDC Director put it, the Freedom House’s 
ranking of Russia at the level of countries like Angola, Libya and Uzbekistan is an exclusionary and 
unfair move that makes Russia resist and rebut it.
4 In the meantime, the sensitiveness of Russian 
authorities to such normative gestures from the part of an international NGO is a good proof of the 
understanding that the only way to gain political subjectivity in international society is through the 
recognition of a country’s democratic credentials and, consequently, observance of democratic 
procedures.
5 
In this paper I will argue that it is exactly this political logic that sustains Russia’s ‘normative 
offensive’; it is therefore, political effects that such a turn eventually entails. More specifically, there 
are three modalities inherent in the politicisation of norms. 
Firstly, most of Russian opinion- and policy-makers admit that there is always a certain degree of 
political decisionism in a normative type of foreign policy. This argument splits into two parts.  
On the one hand, in the likely cases of collision between different norms it is a political decision that 
prioritises one over another. For instance, in discussing the Kosovo situation from the normative point 
of view, Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that there might be a conflict between the two constitutive 
principles of international society - territorial integrity vs. peoples’ right to self-determination. Yet, 
according to him, the first principle has to prevail, since the second deserves a double negative 
marking as a left-over of the Soviet strategy in times of colonialism.
6  
On the other hand, in many cases norms applicable to one situation might appear to be irrelevant to or 
questionable in other – even seemingly similar - cases. Coming back to the Kosovo incident, many 
Russian analysts deem that global politics are defined not by shared rules of the game but rather by 
sovereign decisions on the part of the pivotal actors, first of all the United States and the European 
Union, who most of the time tend to act in a decisionist way.
7 This argument appears to parallel the 
reasoning of those European experts who suggest that “the EU has a very ‘undemocratic’ approach, 
since it tends to select its interlocutors” in a variety of issues related to human rights and democracy.
8 
Secondly, one “of the political effects of norms”
9 is the perspective of exclusion looming large behind 
their implementation. Normativity presupposes an interplay between inclusion and exclusion: certain 
norms are referred to as ‘constitutive’, while others are ignored or marginalised. The normative appeal 
“is more and more marked by a frontier … between those who succeeded in remaining ‘within’ (the 
‘developed’, those to whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc., still apply) and the others, 
the excluded (the main concern of the ‘developed’ with regard to them is how to contain their 
explosive potential, even if the price to be paid is the neglect of elementary democratic principles)”.
10 
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Consequently, “the ‘normal’ ones are the ones born in the ‘normal’ fabric of the so-called European 
culture and believed to be a product of an imagined and invented European and culturally 
homogeneous civilization … which is placed in contrast to the ‘deviant’, the non-native … the one 
born outside Europe”.
11  
All this is arguably very much relevant to EU – Russian relations, since, as many European authors 
assume, “through its normative-power narrative, Brussels necessarily ‘others’ those international 
actors that lack moral fervour… Moreover, in this tradition of thought, the term ‘norm’ is a close 
conceptual affiliate of the term ‘legitimacy’”.
12 As a pertinent example, one may refer to the Polish 
‘Eastern Dimension’ project that introduced ‘Easterness’ not as a unifying platform for shared values 
but as a concept that “underlines the existence of a divide between”
13 the accession countries, on the 
one hand, and Russia – on the other.  
Russian views – even of ostensibly liberal profile - do not seem to differ much from those mentioned 
above: “Under the guise of European values, the EU pursues a peculiar kind of bureaucratic 
imperialism that seeks to modify and partially control EU’s neighbourhood through various 
instruments like the ENP, the Common Spaces, the Energy Charter, etc.”, one author argues.
14 
Another Russian scholar deems that the expansion of EU’s “normative empire” represents a political 
challenge to Russia
15 and pushes her outside the so called “new (enlarged) West”. 
As a reverse side of this challenge, Russia has every reason to perceive the European normative 
discourse as constitutive of her own international subjecthood: in an indicative utterance of Natalia 
Narochnitskaya, “the IDC has to make Europeans question the widely spread stereotype of Russians as 
a barbaric nation”.
16 Thus, the Russian game is two-fold: on the one hand, Moscow does accept the 
normative distance with Europe, though reformulates it in her own way: “today the West is short of 
non-economic values”. What stems from this enunciation is that the West is in no way ‘untouchable’ 
on normative grounds and, therefore, its pretensions to monopolise the interpretation of democracy 
have to be rebuffed.
17 Yet on the other hand, Russia – through a variety of discursive moves – is eager 
to (re)imagine a Europe she might feel comfortable with (“We are to defend not a Europe of gay 
parades, but a Europe of Mozart, Goethe and Schiller”).
18   
Thirdly, the normative type of international policy behaviour leaves ample space for “normative 
disagreements”,
19 i.e. contestation and re-definition of key normative signifiers.  
A major source of discursive discord between Russia and the EU could be discerned in the way both 
parties utilise the normative language of communication. While frequently using the same normative 
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vocabulary, European and Russian discourse-makers deliberately infuse them with different meanings. 
It is exactly where the sources of misunderstanding come from, provoking - as a chain reaction to 
these discursive ruptures – multiple attempts to symbolize the differences. A few examples could be 
pertinent at this juncture, all based upon Ian Manners’ identification of key norms that shape EU 
policies.
20 These norms, arguably, might be tackled, in terms of Ernesto Laclau, as “privileged, 
hegemonic signifiers which structure, as nodal points, the ensemble of a discursive formation”.  Yet, 
in the meantime, these signifiers tend to remain vague and imprecise, and it is exactly what constitutes 
for Laclau “the very nature of the political”.
21 
Peace (and, therefore, security). Here we see a clear perceptional gap: for countries like the UK it is 
the Kremlin that represents a security threat (and, therefore, ought to be securitized) due to its 
complicity in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, while for Russia herself it is the UK, which hosts 
key figures of the Chechen terrorist groups that is perceived as a security problem. The Russian 
government has repeatedly raised similar issues in diplomatic talks with Denmark, Sweden and some 
other European countries. 
Democracy. European discourse contains a number of arguments critical to EU democratic credentials. 
Some authors argue that in the Balkans, “an election is less about domestic legitimacy than about 
international legitimacy”.
22 Others, in the meantime, deem that democracy promotion became a type 
of “technique of governance beyond political discussion”, which faces problems wherever “the power 
relations are so asymmetrical that the attempts to legitimize and rationalize the projection of power 
through technocratic means fail”.
23 
Even the most liberal of Russian policy analysts side with this critique and speak of the “democratic 
deficit” within the European integration process.
24 Meanwhile, in Russia this argument is paralleled by 
an attempt to automatically project the concept of democracy – originally crafted for describing the 
state of domestic political regime – to the whole international area. It is within this context that one 
has to discuss the concept of ‘democratic multipolarity’, which posits that the idea of democracy, 
being transferred from the domestic to the international domain, is denotative of a plurality of interests 
whatever the nature of these interests might be.  It is debatable whether a ‘democratic multipolarity’ 
model with such key actors as, for instance, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Nigeria or Venezuela 
would lead to a more secure world. 
The simultaneous activation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ and ‘democratic multipolarity’ concepts 
renders a profound effect on the way the normative type of arguments is employed by Russian 
authorities. On the one hand, the Kremlin refuses to recognise the legitimacy of any attempts to assess 
the quality of domestic electoral or human rights norms (since Russia’s democracy is a sovereign one, 
no foreign government can impose its standards or judge whether domestic practices correspond to 
any norm external to Russia). On the other hand, Russia keeps a free hand in appraising the 
international behaviour of other countries, expecting them to act ‘democratically’, i.e. respect the 
interests of all parties involved. In other words, having foreclosed the internal political space from 
external criticism, Moscow claims to possess a full right to point a finger at those countries it thinks 
are ‘violators’ of ‘international democracy’ (reduced, as I have mentioned earlier, to the plurality of 
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actors). By doing so, Russia claims that foreign policies of countries that speak of themselves as 
democracies are not that democratic at all: in particular, Putin referred to the European support of the 
‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine as an intervention from the outside which, as a form of external 
pressure, allegedly can’t be democratic.  
The rule of law. Again, Russia’s response to Europe in this domain redirects attention from the 
domestic understanding of the ‘rule of law’ to the international one. Putin repeatedly expressed his 
doubts about whether European countries are sincere in their legal commitments as soon as it comes to 
their foreign policies. The Kosovo debate is perhaps a good case in point.  
Another line of reasoning is the questioning of the leadership of the Western countries in terms of the 
attractiveness of their legal culture. Thus, according to Narochnitskaya, the right of French children to 
denounce their parents is highly controversial for Russians. She then gives another example of legal 
imperfections, this time in the United States where, according to her observations, most of the time 
voters’ identities are not being properly checked.
25  
Liberty. There is a strong Russian conservative discourse aimed at drawing a line of distinction 
between the Western and the Russian versions of liberty. According to the conservative tradition of 
thinking, liberty is not about making individual choices, but about something more fundamental – 
getting rid of sin, including the alleged freedom to commit blasphemy and sacrilege.
26 Many Russian 
political thinkers are convinced of Russia’s ability to confess and defend “genuinely Christian and, 
therefore, genuinely European values, among which the key one is the value of free human beings 
whose liberty is derived from its creation on the basis of the image of the Lord”.
27 
Russian official discourse seems to be more nuanced in this respect. Foreign Minister refers to 
Russia’s eagerness to contribute to the formation of “a single Euro—Atlantic space of freedom and 
democracy” – a strategy that partly explains the creation of the IDC. Yet in the meantime, the 
numerous references to normative arguments lead Russia to criticise those Western countries that, in 
Russia’s opinion, “are ready to forgive the friendly governments for everything – from cracking down 
opposition and pressuring on business to open repressions and even crimes against opponents”.
28 
Respect for human rights. In Europe, the key criticism in this domain is grounded on the presumption 
that “the West presents itself in a form bereft of any normative core as long as its concern for human 
rights only extends to promoting free markets abroad”.
29 The key Russian argument seems to be a bit 
different – it points to the questioning of the universal and absolute applicability of the human rights 
concept. It is highly indicative that these claims come largely from religious circles. Thus, according 
to a key figure in the Russian Orthodox Church, in the public sphere “it is the moral norms that could 
be used as restrictions for human rights implementation”.
30 Otherwise, the logic goes on, the human 
rights agenda might turn aggressive, as exemplified by public demands to legalise same-sex marriages, 
the adoption of children by homosexual couples, gays’ employment in public education, etc. 
There is another twist in Russia’s human rights discourse – the increasing attempts to raise concerns 
about the state of human rights in the EU countries. As the chairman of the “United Russia” party puts 
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it, “Russia is very much troubled by the human rights situation in countries like Estonia and Latvia 
where hundreds of thousands of people are deprived of basic civil rights … since they can’t elect and 
be elected, and their native language can’t be used for communication with authorities”.
31 It is at this 
point that the human rights discourse turns into Russia’s implicit – and somehow dissembling – claims 
to be “more European than Europe itself”: “In making the case against the effacement of the Second 
World War memories, Russia defends European values and the future of all Europe”,
32 – the argument 
goes on. In continuation, Russia is eager to portray itself as a country where ethnic and cultural 
differences are tolerated and respected, as demonstrated by the centuries-long co-existence of the 
Russian and Muslim population in Russia’s heartland. As Narochnitskaya claims, “Europe has 
absolutely no right to accuse Russia of xenophobia, since in this respect Russia appears to be a much 
healthier nation”.
33 
Therefore, one may see that normative discussions are an important part of Russia – EU relations. The 
reasons behind the re-actualization of the normative discourse seem to stretch far beyond specific 
issues like, for example, the fairness of elections in Russia. Russia accepted the normative challenge 
because of the awareness that it is exactly the normative matters that are being used by Western 
countries to define how ‘civilised humankind’ – one facing the threats of terrorism and other security 
challenges – looks. In fact, Russia’s newborn normative zeal is a crucial tool in her attempts to be 
accepted as a legitimate and constitutive member of the international community which, by and large, 
might be equated with the West.
34 In fact, what is at stake is the drawing of the borders of this 
‘international community’ and the distribution of roles within it.  
The normative debates between Russia and Europe mostly deal with such issues as: a) which norms 
should be given priority in particular situations; b) how far each of the two parties should go with 
internationally promoting these norms; and c) whether ‘domestic’ norms may be equally applicable for 
the international arena as well. Indeed, Russia wishes to be recognised in Europe as an equal partner in 
norm-setting, but this intention is not to be understood as an indication of Russia’s possession of its 
‘own’ norms that Europe, arguably, either rejects or disregards. Russia seems to be ready to offer an 
alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive of European identity, but definitely not to substitute 
them with some kind of Russia-only norms or values.   
By way of conclusion, one may argue that Russia apparently accepts strong political connotations of 
norm-based discourse, but the politicisation described above is never complete, since on certain 
occasions it may be reversed by a series of implicitly de-politicised moves. One of them was Dmitry 
Medvedev’s reference – made at the German – Russia Forum in Berlin, June 5
th, 2008 – to human 
rights issues as a value per se, irreducible to matters of political bargaining between Russia and the 
West and not susceptible to any kind of political trade-offs. Another example of the same sort is 
Moscow’s unease with NATO’s insistence on a logical linkage between the normative issues (like the 
state of democracy in applicant countries) and security (their perspectives to join NATO). On the one 
hand, the Kremlin fears being excluded from the NATO-centered security domain on the basis of 
Russia’s alleged failure to meet Western standards of democracy. On the other hand, the troublesome 
lesson Moscow may draw from the conflation of security and democracy arguments is that the more it 
supports undemocratic practices in neighbouring countries, the fewer are their chances of NATO 
membership. It is at this point that an inherently ‘undecidable’ character of Russia’s normative 
discourse becomes obvious: it seeks to reinvent the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law, but in the meantime seems to be succumbing to the temptation of pragmatically implementing 
them as (supposedly) effective foreign policy tools.  
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There is No Such Thing 
as a Normative Chinese model 
Lanxin Xiang
1 
Misreading China’s Rise? 
Many key concepts currently used in the West about China’s internal governance and foreign policy 
can no longer be valid, especially those from the fields of political science and history. We need a new 
conceptual framework and analytical tools.
2 The world's preoccupation with China's sudden rise as an 
economic superpower is a matter of some bemusement among Chinese political leaders and 
intellectuals. Massive trade surpluses with the rest of the world? The embrace of free markets and 
globalisation? The Chinese have been there before. As we see it, this is not China's rise, but rather its 
restoration to its historical position of global influence.  
Today's restoration constitutes China's third great encounter with the West, following the Jesuit 
missions of the 16th century and the Opium Wars of the 1840s. The current encounter – this time 
between equals – will produce much more than economic competition with the West. As China’s 
economic strength grows, no one, not even the Chinese ourselves, can prevent China's influence from 
spreading into politics, values and ideology. It is in those arenas that conflicts with the West, the 
United States in particular, can arise, and unfortunately, it is precisely in those areas that 
misunderstandings between China and the West run rampant.
3 
To come up with a normative Chinese model as regards world affairs, one must start with the simple 
but often neglected fact that China has no faith in any universal value, hence has never offered any 
model in the past and will never do so in the future. Chinese tradition stipulates that any governance 
style, either domestic or external, be contingent in a historical and cultural context. A normative model 
would mean a value system that clamours for universal status, but China never believes in 
‘universalism’ of any kind and universalism (a word synonymous to Catholicism) can never be 
translated accurately into the Chinese language.
4  
Domestic Governance 
Western powers should abandon the idea that the ‘democratisation’ of China will definitely take place 
in the future. From the Chinese perspective, Western democracy in its post-Enlightenment form is a 
Gothic, pseudo-secular system. It is deeply rooted in Christian theology. The United States today 
holds the last defensive line of a political ideology buttressed by a three-fold theology: metaphysical 
interpretation of human history – the Hegelian philosophy of history, a teleological tool of analysis, 
and an eschatological faith. China has none of the above. “Is Confucianism or Daoism a religion?” is a 
question the Westerners are never in a position to answer, but the Chinese never in a position to ask.  
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The democratisation of China is not preordained by universalism. On the contrary, the traditional 
Chinese political logic remains the dominant force in China. The communist party cannot escape the 
same fate as all the dynasties before it. According to tradition, politics is a relationship between water 
and boat. Water (people) can allow the boat (government) to float but can also overturn the boat. The 
real issue of political legitimacy in China is thus not ‘democratic legitimacy’ (or procedural legitimacy 
Chengxu Hefa, as the Chinese call it), but ‘deeds legitimacy’ (Zhengji Hefa) based on the continued 
performance of the leadership. Most Western observers have missed this point. 
The Chinese view about internal and international politics is more coherent than outsiders have 
realised, since it is essentially an ethical one. In Chinese tradition, a ‘state’ is the extension of the 
family, as the Chinese term ‘Guojia’ (state-family, the official terminology for the ‘state’) indicates. 
Thus, only moral authority can guarantee the long-term stability of a family as well as a state. It would 
be misleading therefore to use Imperial Germany as a historical analogy in describing China’s ‘rise’ 
today. To put it simply, there is no inherent ‘power politics’ logic that would automatically lead China 
into repressive policies at home and expansionist policies abroad. Any use of force has to be morally 
justifiable. Even in actual warfare, winning without engaging in battle is considered the most ideal 
result.  
National Security 
The Chinese view of national security is predicated on two factors: the modern Chinese experience 
since the Opium War of 1840s and the traditional culture concerning armed conflict. The first factor is 
crucial, since modern China has been a victim rather than a beneficiary of the existing international 
system (the Westphalia System). Before the Opium War, the Chinese perception of national security 
was based on a relatively benign hegemony – a Sino-centric international relations network, known as 
the Tributary System, in which China received ‘tribute’ (i.e. a formal diplomatic gesture by foreign 
countries to present a gift to the Chinese emperor, symbolising the acceptance of Chinese leadership) 
in exchange for trade and protection.  
The Westphalian conception of power and balance of power was unknown to the Chinese until the 
Opium War and was imposed by Western powers upon Asia to replace the Tributary System with a 
new ‘Treaty System’. Operating through competitive principles of free trade and extraterritoriality, the 
Treaty System never provided China with any real sense of national security. On the contrary, these 
two principles inevitably turned China into a major playground of the political and economic rivalry 
among the Great Powers. In other words, Western imperialism created, for the first time, a malignant 
‘balance of power’ system in Asia that had little to do with local culture. It was a miniature version of 
European power politics.  
In the first half of the 20th century, the ‘rising’ Japanese made an extraordinarily bold attempt at 
establishing a malignant hegemony in the region – the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere”, to replace the Treaty System. But this was a short-lived adventure. After a bloody civil war in 
the late 1940s, the Chinese communist party was able to seize power, with popular support mobilised 
successfully during the war against Japan. The dramatic ending of foreign domination means that 
China has obtained, for the first time in modern history, the opportunity to design a national security 
policy based upon its own national interests. But China’s humiliating past has always cast a long 
shadow on any security policy. Self-reliant economic development and strong national defence have 
been two main pillars of the new regime.  
The second factor, the influence of cultural heritage, is no less important. From the very beginning of 
the People’s Republic, the Chinese view of security has been influenced by China’s ancient tradition 
and attitude regarding the use of force to deal with security threats. Some Western scholars have 
labelled this factor as ‘strategic culture’. According to Iain Johnston, the dominant Chinese strategic 22 | LANXIN XIANG 
culture is parabellum, a term he used to refer to Chinese ‘cultural realism’ – the alleged pro-offensive 
approach to dealing with the threat from the enemy.
5 
This analytical framework seems useful, especially since it is designed to ‘correct’ the prevailing view 
in the West about an inherent Chinese ‘pacifism’. But it is also misleading, because it suggests that 
war and peace can be considered separate subjects in Chinese tradition, ignoring the interactive 
dynamics of the two aspects of using force. The Confucian tradition dictates that the Chinese forego 
territorial conquest and colonial adventure; hence the traditional Chinese purpose of using force has to 
be fundamentally defensive, and linked to the desire of achieving a more durable peace at the frontiers 
through military superiority. The prevailing inclination is neither aggressive nor offensive.  
More significantly, domestic stability always takes priority, since true national security requires, above 
all, building harmony within society, which cannot be achieved by any conquest of a foreign land. The 
alleged Chinese’s propensity of using force is at best a pseudo-thesis, just like another pseudo-thesis:  
the ‘Venus vs. Mars’ parody, advanced by Robert Kagan,
6 about Europe’s innate unwillingness to use 
force in world affairs. The Europeans, like the Chinese, are by no means allergic or oblivious to the 
use of force, they simply want to reduce the role of using force in international affairs and more 
importantly, when force is necessary, it must be used with the consent of the international community 
at large. The Sino-European preference for moral authority in using force should not be confused with 
universal pacifism. Neither China nor the EU holds a typical pacifist view that rejects the use of force 
under any circumstances. It is here that traditional China and ‘postmodern’ Europe meet.  
Undoubtedly, the body that represents the moral authority of the international community has so far 
been the United Nations. Therefore, the EU and China share a common interest in upholding UN 
authority when force must be used in settling international disputes. Multilateral diplomacy is logically 
considered to be the foundation for seeking international consensus.  
Foreign Policy and Global Governance 
In the foreign policy arena, the experience of European integration is equally important, because it 
provides real hope for China’s peaceful integration into the world. Beijing's declared foreign policy 
principle is to promote “peace and development” (heping yu fazhan). This is certainly a great leap 
forward from the days of Mao when ideology dominated China's external relations. However, the 
theme of peace and development does not have a unique operating value, because every country can 
make this general claim. One important, but little noticed, principle that Beijing has recently added to 
its grand strategy of ‘peaceful rise’ is a theory of “democratisation of international relations (guoji 
guanxi minzhuhua)”. Uttered by an undemocratic state, such a theory has failed to be taken seriously. 
However, it is precisely what China may demand from and hope to contribute to the future 
international system.  
By using the word ‘democratisation’, the Chinese seem to be searching for a way to embrace certain 
fundamental values of the cultural West. Specifically, they are eager to see an internationalised version 
of the key principles of the French Revolution of 1789. The principles of ‘Equality, Liberty and 
Fraternity’ inspired a whole generation of the Chinese revolutionaries in the 20
th century, who 
established the People’s Republic. But the West seemed not only to have failed to stave off its 
internecine wars, but also to have adopted a double standard when applying these principles to the 
non-European world. The European Union is in fact the first successful experiment in applying these 
principles to intergovernmental relations. 
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In practical terms, international ‘equality’ is another expression for the multipolar system; 
international ‘liberty’ at least protects national independence; and international ‘fraternity’ requires an 
amicable and multilateral approach bound by international norms and regulations. This is the world 
China has been desperately seeking since the Opium War of 1840. It took some 160 years for China to 
reconcile with a system that has inflicted enormous pains on its people in the past. 
As a result, Chinese diplomatic outlook and behaviour have undergone fundamental transformations. 
Two typical diplomatic behaviours have derived from the painful historical encounter with the West. 
First there was the ‘G-One’ behaviour of distrusting any international system and its sub-systems. For 
most of the Cold War, China was known as a G-One country, pursuing its own independent objectives 
while jealously guarding its national sovereignty. The irony is, in comparison with the United States, 
China had far more experience in unilateralist behaviour. Beijing never had much faith in 
multilateralism, let alone alliances. Its only alliance experience with the Soviet Union ended in a bitter 
confrontation. 
Second, the ‘friend or foe’ mentality is gone. China never understood the European integration process 
until recently, because the European model of diplomatic ‘muddlism’ did not fit the Chinese 
Communist notion of an effective strategy in a revolutionary world.  
Today, China is no longer a revolutionary power. The new Eurasian orientation of China’s grand 
strategy has brought about great changes to China’s foreign policy practices. Since the mid-1990s 
China has abandoned the G-One posture, and begun to participate and initiate multilateral 
organisations. China is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a founder of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a recent member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and a proactive and constructive member of the UN Security Council. But China lost no independence 
in multilateral diplomacy. For example, China is engaged actively in non-proliferation issues without 
necessarily acceding to a Western conception of its rationale. Nevertheless, China has finally stepped 
out of the ‘Middle Kingdom Complex’. 
More interestingly, in the process of rediscovering its own history, China has also discovered the 
unsurpassable advantage of handling its external relations with ‘go-go-muddlism’. The geopolitical 
instinct may tell the leadership in Beijing that the Euro-Asian orientation is far superior to a Pacific 
orientation when searching for a safe route to enter the world. The Euro-Asian continent is absent of 
major strategic confrontations; a muddling-through diplomatic approach may take long time but is 
safer than the water-muddying approach in the Pacific. There the potentially explosive issues are 
abundant, such as the real or imaginary US-China strategic rivalry, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 
a rearming Japan and last but not least, the intractable Taiwan Question. China is eager to learn from 
the EU experience, for the EU happens to be the shining model of muddlism in the 20
th century and 
the current world. 
In conclusion, Beijing is not seeking a place in the sun, but finding a place in the shade. The Euro-
Asian continent casts a long but comfortable shadow for years to come. With a grand strategy of 
‘peaceful rise through Euro-Asia’, a long-term peaceful Chinese foreign policy is thus on the horizon. 
The West should focus not on changing the nature of Chinese internal and external policies, but 
encourage China in a process of reclaiming traditional, Confucian values.  
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India as a Foreign Policy Actor – 
Normative Redux 
Radha Kumar
1 
Introduction 
Observers of Indian foreign policy are often puzzled by its inchoate combination of idealist rhetoric on 
international issues, post-modern nitpicking in negotiations and isolationist behaviour when it comes 
to matters of national interest. “What does India want?” they ask in frustration: “do you want to be a 
major power, or do you just want to score points?”  
The question is a difficult one to answer. When India achieved independence in 1947, the country’s 
founding fathers assumed it would be a leading international player, expanding rules for normative 
behaviour in relation to goals as well as means. But though India’s founding fathers produced grand 
policy visions, such as the 1946 Asian Relations Conference for an institutional structure to buffer 
Asia against the Cold War, they were unable to translate their sweeping goals into action. The Chinese 
revolution, followed by the Korean, Vietnamese and Cambodian wars, brought the Cold War into the 
heart of Asia (Gonsalves 1991). 
Sixty years later, India’s new policy-makers define India as ‘a rising power’ that is today beginning to 
match global goals and means in order to achieve the most favourable results for its citizens, and at the 
same time expand normative principles for inter-state and transnational behaviour. India’s steady 8-
9% growth over the past decade, and the Indian government’s proactive diplomacy in the same period, 
allow Indian policy-makers to bring context and substance to the normative principles that their 
predecessors advocated – a development that one leading Indian analyst describes as “crossing the 
Rubicon” from idealism to pragmatism (Mohan, 2003), and another as “India Unbound” (Das, 2002); 
both phrases indicating what a large leap it is. During the Cold War, Indian policy-makers advocated 
principles divorced from political reality, to use Morgenthau’s definition (Morgenthau, 1982), but 
today they seek to combine normative principles with national interest, in the way that most states do, 
especially those with regional or major power ambitions.  
As other papers in this series have pointed out, categories of what is normative vary from culture to 
culture, and are hotly debated across cultures (Tocci, 2007, pp. 2-3). The international norms that do 
exist do not represent an international consensus on even the lowest common denominators of 
normative international relations; when nations view themselves as normative foreign policy actors 
they are inevitably selective.  
In terms of definition, therefore, this paper inclines towards Daniel Hamilton’s argument that all states 
behave normatively to a varying extent; what is important is the degree to which they are normative as 
well as the issues that elicit their normative behaviour. Thus, for example, the US and China behave 
least normatively when it comes to security threats (accepting that the use of force can be a normative 
means), while most of the EU countries and India tend to be more normative in their reactions. On the 
other hand, the US is most likely to come to the rescue of a persecuted state, the EU and India are less 
likely to and China is the least likely of all. Then again, the US and India provide far greater freedom 
of labour movement, including immigration, than do the EU or China; conversely, the US and China 
are the greatest investors in other countries’ infrastructure development. 
To these distinctions we need to add another variable: regional differentiation. If regional perceptions 
are taken into account – how your neighbourhood views you – China would come off as less 
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threatening than the US, EU or India, not to mention Russia. The EU pattern of pushing norms in its 
immediate neighbourhood is not a common foreign policy practice; less intervention is considered 
more normative in most parts of Asia. This may partly be due to the post-colonial heritage in which 
establishing sovereignty is itself a prime normative goal. 
With these caveats, this paper applied Tocci’s typology to eight case studies of India’s foreign 
relations – with Pakistan, China, Japan, the US, Nepal, Sikkim (now an Indian state), Myanmar and 
the EU – to examine what kind of foreign policy actor India is, accounting for varied purposes and 
power. Do India’s current foreign policy actions conform to its founding fathers’ vision? If they are 
different, can they still be called normative? Have Indian views on what constitutes normative foreign 
policy changed? What can other countries expect from India? 
What do Indians consider to be normative foreign policy?  
Indian views of what is normative in foreign policy are framed by the canonical 3
rd-4
th century text on 
statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra (laws of political economy), which highlighted three key pillars of 
normative state behaviour: engagement with the world, adherence to rule-based norms, and 
transparency.  
Written for the most outward looking of India’s several empires, the Mauryan dynasty, whose rule 
spanned the Indus valley and was home to one of the greatest universities of its time: the Buddhist seat 
of Taxila (now in Pakistan), the Arthashastra viewed the Mauryan empire’s neighbourhood as a core 
foreign policy priority and defined its relations within a set of concentric circles. He also counselled 
more general realist precepts: greater powers should be cultivated, equal or weaker powers could be 
defeated through judicious alliances, and weaker powers could be attacked, patronised or ignored.  
These views led to a debate on whether Kautilya was the ultimate political realist or whether the 
Arthashastra skillfully combined elements of idealism with realpolitik serving the national interest 
(Boesche 2003; Alagappa 1998, pp. 74-5). The latter characterisation is more convincing – Kautilya 
believed that alliances for peace were preferable to war even if war highlighted a country’s primacy 
over others.  
Had the traditional strand remained dominant in Indian foreign policy doctrine it would have been 
easy to classify India as a normative (although not necessarily naively idealist) international player. 
But British colonialism added a new element to Indian foreign policy – that of dependency. Whereas 
previous empires had been rooted in India and adopted foreign policies that served Indian state 
interests, Britain was a far-away country and India’s foreign policy was adapted to suit British 
interests. Thus what I term ‘unrealpolitik’  international action  (because it subordinates national 
interests to that of other countries) entered into Indian foreign policy.  
Indian attitudes towards norms based on Enlightenment values were also complicated by the fact that 
these values arrived in India as a consequence of empire. Indians have tended to view European and to 
some extent American references to normative behaviour with scepticism. Most Indian policy-makers 
and analysts do not, for example, see a difference between European policies in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
and the US and allied invasion of Iraq. Humanitarian intervention, they argue, is not distinct from 
regime change or ‘shock and awe’: it is more often a cover for imperial design (Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, 2003, pp. 44-5; Dixit, 1999; Naqvi, 1999).  
In an attempt to rid itself of unrealpolitik, during the Cold War, India’s foreign policy focus was on 
decolonisation and multilateral constraints over Great Power domination. Furthermore, Indian leaders 
sought consensus rather than using economic, political or military pressure to influence world affairs, 
an approach that lasted well into the 1990s.  
Following the 1962 war with China – which was largely Tibet-driven and in which India suffered a 
crushing defeat – and Nehru’s death in 1964, Indian foreign policy veered back to unrealpolitik, which 
in this case put the interests of the USSR above its own. Unrealpolitik reached its zenith under Indian 26 | RADHA KUMAR 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-75, 78-84), during which period India aligned itself firmly with 
the USSR and its economy became dependent on the Soviet military-industrial complex.  
With the end of the Cold War, India experienced what some called an opportunity to combine 
normative and realpolitik goals (Kumar, 2006), and others defined as a conflict between the two 
(Mohan, 2003). But Indian policy-makers were slow to take advantage of this new opening. It was 
only in the early years of the 21
st century that Indian policy-makers made a concerted effort to re-
engage with the world; and this time it was the Kautilyan strand in Indian foreign policy that came to 
the fore.  
In contrast to India’s Cold War leaders, the country’s new policy-makers came to the conclusion that 
if India was to pull its weight internationally it would have to become an economic and regional power 
(Dasgupta, 2003, pp. 92-111; Schiff, 2006). This was a view that had been cogently put by Kautilya 
and kept alive during most of the Mughal Empire because its rulers became native to India, but was 
then lost during colonial rule and the Cold War.  
After the first wave of economic liberalisation in 1990-1, when many of the bureaucratic constraints 
on industrial growth were lifted, wave two of economic liberalisation prioritised resource and 
infrastructure development. The new policy-makers believed that neither could be achieved without 
integration into the global economy. So they swung into an active diplomatic campaign to improve 
relations with the major powers, identified as the US, EU, Russia, Japan and China (Dasgupta, 2003) 
and implement a ‘Look East’ policy in the wider Asian neighbourhood, especially the ASEAN 
countries where the Indian ‘footprint’ had a long reach (Saran, 2003, p. 115).  
India, which had eschewed membership of multilateral forums under Indira Gandhi, joined a slew of 
regional trade and security organisations in the short span of a decade, such as ASEAN, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, the Asian Regional Forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting process and the East 
Asia Summit. Finally, India’s new policy-makers also recognised that India would fail as a regional 
power until it could turn its South Asian neighbours around. As a result, the Indian government 
launched several new peacemaking initiatives – with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka – hoping that these could help pull South Asia out of the slough of hostility and 
poverty that it had slipped into following independence from British rule.  
The new diplomacy had mixed results. On the whole it yielded rich dividends for improved relations 
with the major powers and East Asia; but South Asia proved to be an uphill climb.  
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What kind of a foreign policy actor is India? From the cases above a mixed picture emerges, but 
certain general conclusions can be derived nevertheless. 
Speaking at a think tank in 2007, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon identified three key goals for 
India foreign policy: “Firstly, ensuring a peaceful periphery; secondly, relations with the major 
powers; and, thirdly, issues of the future, namely food security, water, energy and environment”
2 
(Menon, 2007). 
The means that he enlisted to pursue each goal were different. To build peace in the neighbourhood, 
India looks to create social partnerships, offer economic benefits such as zero tariff for the poorer 
South Asian countries, support cross-border infrastructure and development projects, stress 
‘civilisational linkages’ that grew from the ancient flow of people and ideas, and work for intra-
regional trade through SAARC, ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. Significantly, Menon described 
the neighbourhood, as Saran did, in the same terms as Kautilya: “expanding circles of engagement, 
starting with the immediate neighbourhood, West Asia, Central Asia, South-east Asia and the Indian 
Ocean region”.  
There is, however, a slight elision of categories in this description.  Looking at the eight cases, there is 
a clear distinction between India’s policies in South Asia and India’s policies in East Asia. In South 
Asia, India has increasingly engaged in peacemaking both with its neighbours (Pakistan) and between 
warring factions within its neighbours (Nepal). India has not been so proactive with the one South-
East Asian country with which it shares a land border, Myanmar; and is gingerly in peacemaking with 
its most powerful neighbour, China.  
Indian policy-makers, therefore, perceive a greater threat to the country’s security from instability in 
its South Asian neighbours, an assessment that the US and EU share. They also act with more 
confidence in seeking to resolve the threat, and have used a very wide range of normative means, from 
back channels to hotlines to tracks one and two, from military to civilian CBMs, to help develop 
normative neighbourhood relations. The EU is in some ways a model – India seeks greater regional 
economic integration through SAARC as a means of peace-building in the region. It is significant that 
Menon’s speech was remarkably silent when it came to the peace initiatives that India launched in the 
late 20
th and early 21
st centuries. Whether this means that Indian policy-makers continue to have 
reservations about the scope of and for normative relations in South Asia is an open question. 
Turning to the broader Asian neighbourhood, the first striking point is that India’s Look East policy 
indicates a new departure for India, a focus on maritime interests. India has found it easier to develop 
strong relations with its neighbours at sea than with its land neighbours, and these successes have 
entered Indian doctrine. Today Indian policy-makers see India as “at the confluence of two seas”, to 
use the words of the 17
th century Indian ruler, Dara Shikoh, and India’s navy is involved in an 
increasing number of multilateral exercises to improve maritime security.  
India’s Look East policy has clearly been the primary impetus to India’s recent economic growth and 
has deepened strategic relations with the major powers, whom Menon listed as the US, EU, Japan, 
Russia and China (in that order). India-US strategic cooperation was founded on maritime security in 
South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, as was India-Japan strategic cooperation, and the former was 
accompanied by a rapid rise in trade. Up until 2005 the US was India’s largest trading partner, with a 
trade volume of $32 billion that year. The US has now been outstripped as a trading partner by the EU 
and China, but arguably it was the India-US strategic partnership that prompted the India-EU and 
India-China partnerships, both of which gained substance only after they took off. Menon tellingly 
commented that the India-US partnership had a “positive effect… on our dealings with the rest of the 
world” (Menon, 2007). 
                                                      
2 Shri Shivshankar Menon, “The Challenges Ahead for India’s Foreign Policy”, Speech by the Indian Foreign 
Secretary at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 10 April 2007 (http://meaindia.nic.in/cgi-
bin/db2www/meaxpsite/coverpage.d2w/coverpg?sec=ss&filename=speech/2007/04/11ss01.htm). 28 | RADHA KUMAR 
That said, India’s goals in partnering with the Great Powers were quite different from India’s goals 
with Asia; they were, in Menon’s words, “access to markets, high technology and resources crucial to 
our future economic growth and development”. While Indian goals thus mix realpolitik and normative 
elements, the means that India has used are by and large within the normative framework of 
international law (the EU-India and India-Japan strategic partnerships). But they have also on occasion 
sought to alter or expand international law (the US-India civil nuclear energy agreement). At the same 
time, India is developing institutional partnerships, for example between space, technology, defence 
and agricultural agencies (the EU and US), as well as through membership of regional forums (the 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit).  
If these points indicate that India is beginning to expand as a normative foreign policy actor and has 
been able to bring some depth to its normative behaviour as a rising power, it is also worth noting that 
Indian policy-makers have encountered a surprising obstacle to achieving some of their goals, in 
particular the civil nuclear energy agreement – domestic political opposition. This casts doubt on 
whether there is internal consensus or even clarity on what constitutes the national interest, and raises 
the question of whether the unrealpolitik strand in Indian foreign policy is as strong as ever. 
These factors indicate that India might remain a rising rather than an established power for a longer 
time than it would take if the country’s political parties had an overarching and non-partisan 
conception of the national interest. This is unlikely to affect India’s behaviour as a normative foreign 
policy actor, though it will dent policy-maker confidence and could mean that India’s ability to be 
effective in its actions will be curtailed. Much depends on how well the India-EU and India-US 
partnerships develop on the one hand, and how steadily India’s Look East policy progresses on the 
other hand. The potential is good: each set of relationships is based on a strong foundation of 
goodwill, little strategic competition and Diaspora ties. The India-China relationship is more 
complicated and lacks the foundation that the other three have, but it too could improve as the other 
three progress.  
In short, India is steadily becoming a more influential as well as normative foreign policy actor, 
despite domestic confusion, and this trend is set to grow over the coming decade. 
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